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This volume offers a threefold intellectual juncture. It counterpoises 
the political traditions of republicanism and liberalism, tracing tension-
fields old and new. It solicits early modern political thought to meet with 
present-day political concerns. It also brings together Israeli political 
and legal culture with its European and American counterparts, point­
ing to their common origins and comparing their current topographies 
and concerns. 
A major assumption in this book is that Israeli politics and law are 
derivatives of early modern European thought in ways that are both fa­
miliar and challenging to other descendants of the same tradition. The 
frequent stretching of the concept of Zionism to an analytical catch­all 
for all matters Israeli has obfuscated the country's basic political and 
legal structures that were aimed to steer clear of ideology. Alongside 
the heated rhetoric of nineteenth­century nationalism (some would say 
colonialism), Israel's founders deployed the cool scaffolding of a mod­
ern republic. Insofar as it imbibed major political legacies of modern 
Europe, many of Israel's current predicaments are more akin to those of 
other political societies than many scholars have previously surmised. 
Modern Israel hails from a founding generation that was largely 
secular, an offspring of the Enlightenment (particularly the German 
Enlightenment), and steeped in European intellectual history. Many 
founders of Israel were educated in the high schools and universities of 
Eastern, Central and Western Europe. Most of them had strong Euro­
pean identities, often tragically destroyed before or during World War 
II. Whether socialist, liberal, or "revisionist"­nationalist, their European 
political compass was deeply relevant to the Jewish national awaken­
ing and state building. Zionism itself was a European movement first 
and foremost, deeply embedded in the broad education of its founders. 
Theodore Herzl and Ze'ev Jabotinsky were erudite liberals. David Ben 
Gurion proudly considered himself a self­taught democrat. 
Consequently, the young state's main institutions were those of a 
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liberal democracy; often flawed and gnawed by harsh circumstances, but 
a liberal democracy nonetheless. Its right-of-center ideologues were his­
torically rooted in the age of nationalism, while its predominant left­of­
center creed evolved from modified and mitigated Marxism, channeled 
into social democracy. The "center" itself, from Herzl onward, hailed 
from a bourgeois central­European liberalism strongly committed to the 
rule of law and deeply anchored in the Enlightenment. Most of Israel's 
governmental institutions, and almost all its juridical foundations, be­
long to the latter tradition. 
Over the years, some thinkers and policy­makers have proposed to 
integrate "Jewish" elements into the largely secular framework of the 
state. For example, there have been attempts to make biblical laws rel­
evant to the country's essentially modern legal system. Most of these 
attempts have worked well within the democratic framework, while oth­
ers may seem nationalistic and even atavistic. One consequence is that 
Israel's public sphere today is often mired in the "Jewish or democratic?" 
debate, with Moses and John Stuart Mill playing tug­of­war over the 
country's political and moral identity. Israel's intellectual legacy, how­
ever, is far more complex and multifaceted than that. 
Moses and Mill do not represent disparate and competing traditions. 
If one takes a closer look, some important Jewish legacies would disclose 
affinity to a broader European genome: the philosophy of Maimonides 
owes a great debt to Aristotle, and the modernizing project of Men­
delssohn was part and parcel of the German Enlightenment. Converse 
impacts were at work, too: some crucial aspects of European political 
thought, specifically the ideas of liberty and justice associated with early 
modern natural law and maturing in the works of Hugo Grotius and 
John Locke, bear the fingerprints of those who looked at the ancient 
Hebraic republic for concepts of the good polity. Thus, "Jewish" ethics 
and politics drew sustenance from the same origins that fed European 
intellectual history, and vice versa. 
Common legacies—the quests for liberty, civic equality and social 
justice—have enabled a strong and intimate dialogue between Israelis 
and Europeans in the immediate aftermath of the Holocaust and the 
founding of the State of Israel, from the 1950s to the 1970s. Israel was 
seen, not least through its own eyes, as a young European democracy 
rising from the ashes of the darkest European dictatorship. However, 
these intertwining traditions have lost some of their weight within Is­
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raeli society during the recent decades. Some Israelis find Europe and 
its political culture alien and menacing. Some critics, both in Israel and 
beyond, now tend to see Israel as a combination of religious fundamen­
talism and several despised aspects of the European legacy: chauvinism, 
expansionism and imperialism. 
Yet the stamp of Europe, most specifically of Germany, on the Israeli 
constitutional structures covers far more ground than one may imagine. 
"Western" and "Jewish" elements are woven together: liberal discourse 
can underpin ultra­Orthodox sectarianism, and social democracy some­
times enlists biblical quotations to struggle against free market ideol­
ogy. Significantly, the legal and moral justifications of civil equality for 
Israel's Arab minority, as well as the Palestinian bid for independence, 
are rooted in European political traditions. So was the historical Jewish 
demand for a sovereign state. 
One purpose of a theoretical conversation involving Israel, Europe 
and the United States is to examine how much Israeli society still owes 
to its early modern legacies. European societies today may wish to do the 
same. Israel is a touchstone—at times extreme, but often revealing— 
for the current relationship between European legacies and European 
realities. On the other hand, early modern republicanism displays some 
Hebraic fingerprints, and the early liberalism of the Enlightenment 
engaged with Jews as a test case for civil rights and minority emanci­
pation. On the other hand, Europe's present­day engagement with its 
new migrant minorities and with its recent religious differentials bears 
some similarities to Israel's complex relation with its own native Arab 
citizenry, as well as with the Palestinians residing in the Israeli­occupied 
territories. On certain points, notably the impressive influx of Israeli­
Palestinians into the universities and the professions, Israel may be able 
to teach its European counterparts a useful lesson. On other points, no­
tably the upholding of civil and human rights under occupation, Israel is 
requested to heed critical European voices. 
Both Israelis and Europeans, however, may do well to become 
more attuned to the pre­nationalistic legacy of early European moder­
nity, where ideas of liberty, civic commitment and political justice were 
played out in contexts relatively immune to the vicissitudes of ethnic 
strife. This is why early modern political thought, while not "Jewish" in 
any outright sense, is so interesting in our context. The tension field of 
republicanism and liberalism may well prove relevant to European and 
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Israeli current affairs in ways similar to its ongoing American relevance. 
Open issues of political deliberation today—cultural cohesion, migra­
tion, minority and collective rights, individual autonomy, sovereignty, 
universal jurisdiction, humanitarian concerns in peace and war—are all 
at stake. On a deeper level, citizenship, nationhood, freedom and maybe 
even rationality, are all part of the early modern resonance in current 
public affairs. Republican and liberal ways of thinking about the politi­
cal and the social realm do not necessarily provide solutions for current 
problems; but they remain helpful analytical tools for understanding 
tensions in modern societies that are rooted in early modern options. 
In this sense, republicanism and liberalism are not understood as 
two distinct and clear­cut ideologies, but as political languages and sets 
of ideas and values, conveying notable differences but also sharing sig­
nificant similarities. It would be anachronistic to claim authors such as 
John Locke, Charles de Montesquieu, Thomas Jefferson or even Adam 
Smith for one camp in a hypothetical exdusivist struggle between repub­
licanism and liberalism. The ongoing debates about these concepts—to 
which some of the authors of this volume have made important contri­
butions in the last decades—have not produced general agreement on 
their definition. The spectrum of interpretations is also manifest in the 
articles gathered in this book. The liberal­republican quandary acquires 
new dimensions when dealing with different political cultures. As this 
collection of essays readily demonstrates, variegated national, cultural 
and scholarly backgrounds yield differing interpretations of the terms. 
In an ideal typical sense, it is nevertheless helpful to characterize the 
editors' own understanding of the two major concepts, from the per­
spective of early modern history of political thought. 
Republicanism is understood as an essentially pre­modern way of 
thinking about power, liberty and participation, although it has had a 
lasting effect on modern political thought and political practice, too. In 
early modern societies, the individual rights of a citizen were not crucial 
for political order. Most men, not to speak of the women, were subjects, 
not citizens. If they had rights, those were collective rights of a social 
estate, a town, a monastery, or a university. It was not yet the sovereign 
state that generally guaranteed its citizens equal individual rights. Be­
longing to a circumscribed social or economic entity procured particular 
rights. Such rights were a privilege, and they demanded conformity—in 
religious faith, in political opinions, in manners and in values. Besides 
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conformity, there were other prerequisites for citizenship tha t were 
barely questioned by anybody: a citizen had to be male, he had to be 
economically self-standing and contribute to the common weal by pay­
ing taxes and serving in the militia, he should sacrifice his own interests 
and even his blood for the sake of the common weal. Thus, the inter­
nal role of the citizen was closely linked to the external survival of the 
body politic in the dangerous world of sovereign states tha t developed 
in early modern Europe—a struggle for survival conceived in military 
terms by authors in the Machiavellian tradition, but increasingly seen as 
a commercial, and more generally economic, competit ion for prosperity 
and power. 
Hence the republican insistence on individual virtue within a par­
ticular political community, discussed as the subject mat ter of moral 
philosophy recommending self­abandonment and disinterestedness. 
This set of beliefs derived sustenance not only f rom Aristotle, the Ro­
man republicans and the Stoa, but also f rom Christian and (as we are 
increasingly aware) Hebraic sources. 
In contrast to republican ideals, the natural law tradit ion leading to 
liberalism shif ted its focus f rom the community to the individual, of ten 
understood in abstract and universal terms, and focused on individual 
rights. This opposition can be labeled, with Benjamin Constant, as 
Hberte des anciens against liberte des modernes or, with Isaiah Berlin, as 
the positive liberty to exercise political participation versus the nega­
tive liberty f rom governmental coercion. For the republican, liberty is 
a virtuously achieved, but constantly endangered privilege and a duty 
with the aim to establish justice and concord in a predominantly agrar­
ian world. For the liberal, it is the pre­politically founded and insti tu­
tionally protected right to individual pursuit of happiness within the 
limits of law, guaranteeing property and eventually producing public 
wealth as an unintended side­effect of self­serving interest ("private 
vices") within an economy based on the division of labor. During the 
eighteenth century, these natural law based liberal beginnings flour­
ished into a full­fledged philosophy. The Enlightenment developed ideas 
of universal rights and values, political representation instead of direct 
democracy, separation of powers and insti tutional checks and balances 
enabling and even legitimizing the co­existence of differing individual 
interests, culminating in the modern notion of political parties. This 
cluster of theoretical innovations formed a crucial juncture. The new, 
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liberal republic of self-interested individuals began to par t ways with 
the former republican ideal of a commonwealth of selfless citizens. At 
the same t ime, new ideas of the nation colored the collective sphere in 
cultural, linguistic and historical shades very different f rom the earlier 
republican citizenry, which seldom if ever depended on ethnic singulari­
ties as a major construct of identity. 
The essays in this volume offer new ways of pondering these prob­
lems. The contributors—historians, philosophers, political scientists 
and legal scholars—were invited to reflect whether the political con­
cepts and debates of the era preceding the nation state, and in particular 
the thought of the Enlightenment, might prove conducive to our under­
standing of the problems of our era, when nation states are undermined 
and their staying power is questioned. While common to all modern 
democracies, these newly sharpened questions are uniquely relevant 
to those European countries tha t are incorporating large minorities 
of recent migrants into their societies and cultures. At the same time, 
they are relevant for a European Union that , as a whole, has reduced 
all nations to minorities within a supra­national political and economic 
infrastructure. For such a meta­national body, not only do uniform laws 
and rules need to be established; but it also requires a shared identity 
tha t legitimizes redistributions and produces acts of solidarity, an iden­
tity tha t inevitably has its fundament s in history. The United States can 
serve as a model in some aspects; not because they have resolved these 
questions, but because they have to face them as well and do so within 
their own traditions. And other nations outside the European Union, 
such as Switzerland, are not immune to such challenges even if their 
citizens continue to believe in the exceptionalism of a chosen people. In 
general, such a self­perception may have survived bet te r—for different 
reasons—in the relatively recent nation­states of Israel and the United 
States than among the European nations whose pasts, not only in the 
Nazi era, are laden with failure and atrocities. 
Early modern political thought is fascinating in its own right. The ma­
jor political issues of the early twenty­first century do not always yield 
easily to historical analysis. While this volume aims to juxtapose past 
and present , we do not propose to do this hastily. The coming chapters 
offer several novel at tempts at a historical cum current affairs discussion 
of the shared and mutually tense republican and liberal legacies in Eu­
rope, Israel and the United States. Although the articles have been put 
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in a roughly chronological order, they of ten refer to each other—in ways 
both affirmative and contradictory—in spite of the temporal gaps tha t 
might separate them. The chronological order should not be understood 
as a historical narrative of a single—republican and/or l iberal—path to­
wards, for example, liberty or modernity. The trajectory outlined here is 
just one of many ways to interpret challenges and responses in different 
states and within a converging world. 
John G. A. Pocock begins with the European distinction between 
autonomous sacred and secular authorities, rooted in imperial Rome 
and leading to the early modern sovereign state tha t became the frame­
work for both republican and liberal concepts of liberty, each similarly 
opposing the Church and the ecclesiastic claims for t ru th . Hence, his­
torical narratives played a decisive role as alternatives for seeking out 
the fundaments of political thought . To a lesser extent than classical 
Rome, but recently of increasing interest to scholars, the Hebrew repub­
lic served early modern thinkers as a constitutional model for self­rule, 
distributive justice and civil legalism, a this­worldly inst i tut ion existing 
in history, but ennobled by divine establishment (Fania Oz­Salzberger). 
A better­known matrix for analyzing the incorporation of citizens and 
the role of the political demos was the Athenian polis, discussed here 
by Christine Zabel. Moving on to the republican reassessments of the 
Enlightenment era, Urte Weeber presents the major republics of the 
eighteenth century, Venice, the Netherlands, and Switzerland, all of 
which st imulated debate on the best constitution, but , confronting the 
rise of commercial society, were increasingly disparaged as stagnated 
relics of the past. The fu ture belonged to the new kind of republic tha t 
arose in the United States of America, where ­ alongside Rome ­ biblical 
republicanism and its Hebraic models again inspired the settlers erect­
ing a "second Israel" (Eran Shalev). 
While republican thinkers argued f rom historical precedence, liberal 
thought originated in a philosophy of nature. For Thomas Hobbes, this 
was a voluntary choice aimed at subordinating the rights of individuals, 
which he radically redefined, to the sovereign state tha t alone could guar­
antee them. Gordon Schochet explains also how Locke mitigated this 
interpretat ion of natural law and paved the way for inalienable rights to 
become the anchor of the American and French revolutions. From Hugo 
Grotius onwards, the natural law tradit ion was equally impor tan t to 
international law. Marco Geuna discusses critically how the concepts of 
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just war and of human rights, which originated in early modern Europe, 
were reformulated and used to legitimize armed interventions in the 
asymmetric new wars of the last twenty years. 
Further critical reflections on early modern legacies in present-day 
contexts are offered in the later chapters, which examine relevant 
tension-fields in three political cultures. Sam Fleischacker revisits Adam 
Smith to explain the danger awaiting states that leave poor relief to reli­
gious groups: support for the poor should be seen as a matter of justice 
among fellow citizens, not as charity invoking humility and veneration 
towards the morally superior donor. Raef Zreik explains the ambiguity 
of the civic discourse in Israel, which cannot be seen only as the tri­
umphing liberal paradigm of equal rights. The political redefinition of 
citizenship and Israeli identity enabled an ethnocratic exclusion of the 
Palestinians in Israel who, while enjoying basic civil rights, are forbid­
den or unable to participate in seemingly abstract civic duties such as 
military service. 
A different outcome of the ascending importance of legal procedure, 
this time in international relations, is the rise of extraterritorial and 
universal jurisdiction, considered by Amnon Reichman as acceptable 
if limited to exceptional cases of adjudication. On this turf, liberal and 
universalist juridical ideals may clash with traditional rule­of­law sover­
eignty. Israel has played varied roles, all of considerable importance, in 
this global development. It was also a party—however minor—to the 
claims put forward by Jewish organizations and in class actions against 
Swiss banks withholding assets of Holocaust victims. Thomas Maissen 
explains the litigation and the public debate surrounding these cases 
as a debate on collective memory, a confrontation between the Swiss 
glorification of their republican past and others' experiences, especially 
of the Holocaust, that have become the core element of supra­national 
human rights discourse. Such is also the argument in Diana Pinto's con­
cluding essay, where she distinguishes between disparate lessons learnt 
from the War and the genocide. "Never again" has different meanings in 
Europe and in Israel, and this dissonance may shed light on numerous 
misunderstandings and tensions between these two partners. 
The historical and geographical scopes of this volume of essays, as 
well as its range of contributing academic disciplines, make it a unique, 
and rather ambitious, attempt at expanding the horizons of our current­
affairs debates. While eschewing any pretense to completeness or 
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congruence, contributions to this volume are inter-conversing on many 
levels. Its editors and other authors all share a sense of intellectual 
urgency: if any of the major social, political and economic issues of our 
day are to be addressed responsibly, the broadening of comparative 
scopes across space and time is of utter necessity. We consider this book 
to be a proposed beginning, rather than a tidy conclusion, of such an 
opening of vistas from our non-distant past to our immediate future. 
This book emerged from a research project led by the two editors and 
from an international conference held in January 2010, both funded 
by the German Israel Foundation (GIF) through a three-year grant, 
thoughtfully extended over a further year to complete the publication 
process. The conference received additional funding from the Posen 
Forum for Political Thought at the Haifa Faculty of Law and from the 
Department of History at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, through 
the good auspices of Professor Avihu Zakai. The Faculty of Law at the 
University of Haifa hosted two meetings of the research team, as well 
as the concluding international conference. We are grateful to Tamara 
Krakovich, to Dorit Arbel, and to the conference team including Noemi 
Harari, Boaz Gur, and the inimitable Kalanit Kleemer. At the University 
of Heidelberg, the Department of History hosted several workshops of 
the research team, organized by Elisabeth Natour, Antoinette Saxer, 
Urte Weeber and Christine Zabel. Anne Brady, Philipp Flammer and 
Erika Lokotsch contributed their precious expertise to the editing of 
this volume. The editors most gratefully acknowledge their debt to all 
the aforementioned. 
Thomas Maissen, Heidelberg 
Fania Oz-Salzberger, Haifa 
— 15 — 
